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KEY POINTS 
Uncertainty about the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme still poses a major challenge to the 
international community, and to the Middle East in particular. More than ten years of negotiations have 
brought no resolution to the dispute, so in recent years the EU and the US have upped the pressure on the 
Islamic Republic. In January 2012 the EU adopted an unprecedented sanctions package, mainly directed at 
the Iranian oil industry. Together with US measures, this strike at the centrepiece of the Iranian economy 
was intended to force the Iranian regime to agree to demands of the international community in the 
framework of the ‘E3+3’ (Germany, France, the UK, plus the US, China and Russia) negotiations, conducted 
under the auspices of EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton.  
The aim of this Policy Brief is to assess how effective the current economic sanctions policy is and whether it 
could contribute to a negotiated resolution of the nuclear standoff. 
Eighteen months after the adoption of the oil embargo, figures show that the Iranian economy has been hit 
hard by EU and US sanctions. Yet, considering the declared objective of changing the regime’s behaviour 
vis-à-vis its nuclear programme, the results are rather unsatisfying. First, the impact on the Iranian economy 
and the unintended side effects of sanctions have created a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect rather than provoke 
domestic criticism of the regime’s nuclear policy. Second, the tough stance of the EU and the US has not 
slowed down the nuclear programme; on the contrary, it has accelerated.  
Instead of further isolating Iran, the authors argue for a return to a more balanced dual-track approach so as 
to reinforce the moderate narrative within the Iranian ruling elite. 
Key recommendations: 
•  Convince Iranians that sanctions are only directed at the military aspects of the nuclear programme, not 
at civilian enrichment. 
•  Fine-tune the implementation of sanctions so as to prevent blocking of food and medicine. 
•  Engage European and Iranian civil society organisations with the help of informal ‘track II’ diplomacy 
in order to dispel mutual misperceptions and look for solutions. 
•  Besides the gradual lifting of sanctions, project the extension of trade and security policy cooperation so 
as to incentivise the Iranian regime to find a peaceful solution. 
•  Allow more time for negotiations. There should be no talk of a military strike on Iran before the E3+3 
process has been exhausted. 
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1.  Introduction 
The efforts of the ‘E3+3’ – the EU-led consortium 
of the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council and Germany – to talk Iran into 
suspending its uranium enrichment programme 
and accepting broad oversight for all of its 
nuclear activities by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) have been accompanied 
by United Nations sanctions since 2006. These 
restrictive measures are aimed at preventing 
Tehran from acquiring the material, equipment 
and technology that can be used for military 
nuclear programmes. Frustrated by the limited 
impact of the UN sanctions and Iran’s salami 
tactics in pursuing its nuclear ambitions in 
secret, the EU and the US last year adopted a 
series of much tougher measures to bring the 
clerical regime in Tehran to heel. Russia and 
China have condoned these new western 
sanctions but have opposed their adoption at the 
level of the UN Security Council. 
The European Union’s oil embargo, in particular, 
was assumed to cause Iran economic pain and 
thus force it back into negotiations on substance. 
In two recent rounds of substantive talks in 
Kazakhstan, in February and April 2013, the 
E3+3 tried to push Iran to, inter alia, halt 
production and stockpiling of uranium enriched 
to 20% – a step away from achieving nuclear 
weapons capability, convert its existing 20% 
enriched uranium into fuel for a research reactor, 
and suspend all enrichment of more than 5%. In 
return, the world powers suggested easing 
certain sanctions on Iran. The talks at Almaty 
failed to cajole Iran into making any concessions, 
however. In view of the June 15th  presidential 
elections in Iran and Ramadan afterwards, no 
diplomatic progress should be expected until 
after the summer period. Meanwhile, the 
drumbeat of military intervention continues 
undimmed in Israel, even if the Iranian regime’s 
response is hard to predict.  
This troubling state of affairs begs the question 
whether the EU-led coercive diplomacy towards 
Iran, as it is currently designed, can produce the 
desired outcome, i.e. a nuclear weapons free 
Iran. In particular, it raises the question whether 
the restrictive measures imposed autonomously 
on Iran by the EU and the US are having any 
effect. Or have they actually strengthened the 
regime’s tenacity for enduring economic 
sanctions, regardless of their severity? If the 
sanctions are ineffective, what better way 
forward is there? 
2.  A ‘smart’ embargo? 
When in January 2012 the EU imposed another 
set of economic sanctions against the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, the main target was the heart of 
the country’s economy, its energy industry. Iran 
has the fourth-largest oil and the second largest 
gas reserves in the world.1 Oil revenues make up 
50-60% of the government’s total revenues.2 In 
2011 oil-related materials constituted 92.4% of 
the country’s total exports to the EU and 80% of 
its worldwide exports.3 Given that the European 
Union had been the buyer of 18% of Iran’s total 
crude oil exports and European companies are 
the world’s leading shipment insurers, an EU oil 
embargo was thus expected to have considerable 
effect on the Iranian economy, especially since it 
was accompanied by restrictions of activities 
with the Iranian central bank. The professed goal 
of these measures, however, was neither to 
punish the Iranian people nor to crush the 
Iranian economy. These so-called ‘smart’ 
sanctions were expected to diminish the income 
sources of the Iranian regime and the 
Revolutionary Guard – the Praetorian guard of 
Supreme Leader Khamenei, which is considered 
the main operator of the oil industry4 and the 
driving force of the nuclear programme.5  
One-and-a-half years on, a first assessment can 
be made about the effectiveness of the EU oil 
embargo and its usefulness in the diplomatic 
process with Iran. In investigating the 
‘intelligence’ of the EU’s targeted sanctions, the 
following questions can be posed: has the 
population indeed been spared the impact of 
economic warfare, have the measures weakened 
their addressees or have they been 
circumvented? In the latter case, to what extent 
has the embargo led to a trade diversion of 
Iranian oil products?  
To be sure, measuring the impact of EU 
sanctions is an exercise fraught with difficulty, 
since the actual consequences of the Union’s 
restrictive measures cannot be seen 
independently from the measures imposed by 
the US and the UN. This paper will therefore 
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determine the effect of the European Union’s 
sanctions policies adopted against Iran. 
3.  Shielding the EU from the impact 
of sanctions 
Bearing in mind that oil makes up more than 
one-third of the EU’s total energy consumption 
and imports from non-member states make up 
about 84% of the Union’s oil supply,6 there were 
concerns that a drop in oil supplies and a 
subsequent price hike might put crisis-ridden EU 
member states in an even more precarious 
position. In fact, during the intra-EU negotiations 
on the oil embargo, debt-stricken countries like 
Greece, Italy and Spain tried to deflect the 
adoption of an EU oil embargo by arguing that 
emerging countries such as China or India could 
undermine the effectiveness of the oil embargo 
by replacing EU member states’ share of Iranian 
oil exports.7 This argument did not carry the day, 
however, and the sanctions package was 
adopted. Yet Greece was able to replace most of 
its Iranian crude imports with Russian oil, for 
instance.8 The recovery of oil production in Libya 
and Iraq facilitated the access to alternative 
supplies for others. As for the price of crude, 
sceptics of the oil embargo were proved only 
partly right. Gulf States considerably increased 
oil production in 2012 and US oil production also 
saw an exceptional increase. This compensated 
the drop in Iranian supply and helped to keep 
the world oil price at its 2011 level of slightly 
more than $111 per barrel. 
4.  Curbing the circumvention of EU 
sanctions 
Having shielded its own economy from the 
embargo, the EU soon became more concerned 
about the risk that Iran could circumvent its oil 
embargo by simply reorienting its oil exports 
eastwards, towards China, India, Japan and 
South Korea. To prevent this shift of trade to 
Asian markets, the EU ban on insurances for oil 
shipments intended to limit the attractiveness for 
third states to purchase Iranian oil. As European 
insurance companies insure and reinsure 95% of 
the world’s tanker fleet,9 the ban was expected to 
have considerable bite. 
Energy-hungry and sanctions-averse China was 
especially unhappy with the negative impact of 
the EU’s new autonomous restrictive measures. 
From the second half of 2012 on, Iran and its 
Asian trade partners found other ways to 
circumvent the new EU measures: China sold 12 
super tankers to Iran to enable Tehran to 
transport its oil to Chinese ports.10 This way 
Beijing shifted responsibility for dodging the 
West’s sanctions to Iran. India, the second largest 
buyer of Iranian crude, allowed its insurers to 
cover oil shipments to up to $50 million.11 Delhi 
is currently planning to set up a state reinsurance 
fund of up to $368,4 million to cover local 
refiners using Iranian oil.12 Japan, for its part, 
established sovereign guarantees on ships 
carrying Iranian oil.13 South Korea, similar to 
China, imported Iranian oil via Iranian vessels.14 
Although these measures have helped Iran to 
dodge the oil embargo, they did not fully 
compensate for the loss in Iranian sales caused 
by EU sanctions. Chinese and South Korean oil 
imports were complicated because the limited 
Iranian tanker fleet does not have the same 
transportation capacities as the Chinese and 
South Korean ones.15 Also, with guarantees up to 
a maximum of $50 million, coverage provided by 
Indian insurance companies is only a fraction of 
the one billion US dollar guarantee usually 
provided by European insurers.16 Therefore, 
Indian refiners remain relatively cautious in 
purchasing Iranian crude. 
A contextual approach is needed to assess the 
effectiveness of the EU oil embargo against Iran 
in isolation. One important part of the overall 
picture is the set of the restrictive measures 
adopted by the US against Iran. 
5.  EU and US sanctions: an effective 
tandem? 
Washington first imposed oil related sanctions 
on 31 December 2011, i.e. a few days before the 
EU adopted its embargo. The extraterritorial 
effect of the US sanctions foresees the adoption 
of punitive measures against all those countries 
that do not “significantly reduce” their crude 
imports from the Islamic Republic. Significantly, 
the US sanctions mechanism allows for certain 
(gradual) exceptions. In order to obtain a waiver 
from a total ban on imports for a period of 180 
days, countries have to reduce their total oil 
imports compared to the previous period.17 
China, in particular, has benefited from this 
loophole in the American legislation.18 Figure 1 4 | BLOCKMANS & WAIZER 
 
below nevertheless shows that, although 
Chinese, Indian, South Korean or Japanese 
imports did not decline continuously, all of these 
countries imported between 20 and 30% less 
Iranian oil over the first 12 months of the 
adoption of sanctions compared to 2011.19  
 
Figure 1 
 
Source: IEA Oil Report, March 2013. 
Combined with the US extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, the restrictive measures imposed by 
the EU considerably restrain the Iranian regime’s 
possibilities to sell its oil.  
Due to the ban on investment in the energy 
sector imposed by the EU in 2010, Iran’s oil 
production started to decline in the second half 
of 2011. Figure 2 below shows that production 
reached its lowest point in September 2012. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Source: IEA Oil Market Report, March 2013. 
Although Iranian crude prices did not, as 
predicted by some analysts, considerably 
decrease, Iranian net oil revenues went down by 
50%, from $100 billion in 2011 to approximately 
$50 billion in 2012.20 This decline in revenues, 
combined with the sanctions on the financial 
sector and bad economic policy by the Iranian 
government,21 reinforced the economic problems 
of the country. The coercive measures taken by 
the EU and the US led to an estimated 
unemployment rate of over 20%, inflation of 
about 30%22 and skyrocketing prices for 
consumer goods.23Apart from these economic 
consequences, the western sanctions regimes 
also had unintended side effects. The shortage of 
foreign currency and the growing uncertainty of 
foreign companies to deal with Iran have caused 
shortages of medicine.24 Although trade in food, 
humanitarian goods and medicine are not 
banned, European companies prefer not to take 
the risk of being sanctioned, either by the EU or 
the US. This reluctance is understandable in light 
of two recent developments in the enforcement 
of the restrictive measures. 
Firstly, both the EU and the US have shown that 
they are serious about enforcement. Whereas 
Washington sanctioned a Greek businessman 
who had provided Iran with tankers,25 in its 
judgment of 21 December 2011, Case C-72/11, 
the European Court of Justice broke new ground 
by taking up the so-called “provisioning ban”. 
The ECJ clarified the scope of prohibited 
activities pertaining to the freezing of funds and 
economic resources put in place by the EU to 
combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons in 
Iran.26 Driven by this purpose, the Court held 
that the ban should be interpreted broadly so as 
to encompass the supply and installation of 
items capable of contributing to nuclear 
proliferation, even where the item itself is not 
ready for use. As such, the EU is able to respond 
to the creative ruses of those who seek to veil the 
true purpose of their plans, circumvent the 
sanctions or exploit the weaknesses of the rules 
that underpin them. 
Secondly, a series of judicial proceedings before 
the European Court of Justice has shown that 
Council decisions do not necessarily provide 
legal certainty. Mostly, these cases have centred 
on the Council’s decisions to black-list persons, 
organisations, banks, companies or entities and 
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sanctions.27 This lack of legal certainty 
undermines the protection of business interests. 
6.  Does economic pressure lead to 
policy change? 
EU sanctions were intended to weaken the 
(hardline elements in the) Iranian regime so that 
it would accept the demands outlined by the 
E3+3; namely to suspend all enrichment of more 
than 5%, convert its existing 20% enriched 
uranium into fuel for a research reactor and 
export the rest, as well as to put its Fordow 
nuclear site in reduced readiness status without 
dismantlement. 
Reports about the stability of the Iranian regime 
have been contradictory for a long time now. A 
poll conducted among 1,000 Iranians aged 15 
and over in February 2013 by Gallup shows that 
the regime has not in fact been weakened by the 
impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy and 
society (see Table 1 below). On the contrary, 54% 
of Iranians mostly blame the West for the 
sanctions, and only 10% holds the Iranian 
government responsible.28 With regard to the 
Iranian elite, a recent authoritative report 
concludes that the ongoing economic sanctions 
would lead to a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ dynamic 
rather than reinforce internal fissures.29 
 
Table 1. Opinion poll among Iranians 
 
Source: Gallup, February 2013. 
 
Although the Iranian economy is hit hard by the 
oil embargo, the regime in Tehran is still 
managing to mitigate its effects by providing its 
own insurances, reflagging its ships, accepting 
currencies other than the euro or dollar, blending 
its crude with other fuels, and loading its tankers 
at remote. As mentioned, the regime also gains 
revenues from the two major buyers of Iranian 
crude, China and India. China’s imports have 
increased considerably in February and March 
2013.30 Sinopec, one of China's top oil companies, 
declared in March that it would “maximise” its 
import volume from Iran.31 Meanwhile, India's 
foreign secretary Mathai stated in April 2013 that 
his country would continue to purchase Iranian 
crude and Prime Minister Singh signalled that 
Iran would remain an important trade partner.32 
Domestically, the Iranian regime has partly 
compensated losses of oil revenues by the 
adoption of countermeasures and the windfall 
from unintended side effects of the sanctions 
regimes. A diversification of goods' exports was 
facilitated by a 50% drop in value of the Iranian 
Rial.33 Combined with a controlled reduction of 
imports, the Islamic Republic managed to 
achieve a positive trade balance in 2012. In 
addition, thanks to new taxes, a privatisation 
wave (mostly in favour of the Revolutionary 
Guard)34 and the reduction of expenses, the 
Iranian government found ways to keep its 
deficit at a tolerable level.35 Thus, the Iranian 
regime has proved to be willing and able to shift 
the economic burdens caused by the sanctions on 
to its people.  
 
Figure 3. Build-up of enrichment centrifuges 
 
Source: D. Albright et al., ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran 
Safeguards Report, May 22, 2013, at 9 
(www.isis-online.org). 
In sum, the EU’s so-called “smart sanctions” not 
only fail to hit their targets, they also adversely 
affect those to whom no harm is intended. 6 | BLOCKMANS & WAIZER 
 
Moreover, the latest IAEA report and the 
botched negotiations with the E3+3 in 
Kazakhstan show no change of course in 
Tehran’s willingness to abandon its nuclear 
programme. On the contrary, and most 
damningly, Iran has even accelerated the build-
up of its enrichment centrifuges (see Figure 3 
above).36 
7.  Why sanctions do not work 
Considering the objectives of the EU’s “smart 
sanctions”, the result is rather unsatisfying. 
Whereas 56% of the Iranian population say that 
sanctions have hurt their livelihood “a great 
deal”,37 Iran’s stockpiles of low- and medium-
enriched uranium, as well as the number of 
centrifuges, are growing steadily and the 
Revolutionary Guard’s economic and political 
influence remains undisputed. Why is the 
transatlantic sanctions policy not working? The 
simple answer is that economic sanctions have, 
in all but a few cases, never convinced an 
authoritarian regime to redefine its major 
political goals.38  
The more complex answer can be detailed in 
four points: 
-  Economic isolation strengthens rather than 
weakens the domestic power of the regime’s 
hardliners and the driving force of the nuclear 
programme. Coping with sanctions since the 
first Gulf War, the Revolutionary Guard has 
learnt from experience that it benefits from 
proximity to the regime in order to 
circumvent the current wave of restrictive 
measures. Since non-affiliated local 
companies do not have these advantages and 
because foreign companies’ access to the 
Iranian market is increasingly restricted, the 
Revolutionary Guard’s position in the Iranian 
economy is in fact growing steadily.39 
-  After the American-organised overthrow of 
Prime Minister Mosaddegh in the 1950s and 
US support for the Shah and Iraq during the 
first Gulf War, sanctions are perceived as yet 
more proof that Washington will only accept 
a dependent and submissive Iran. Combined 
with fierce anti-American propaganda it is not 
surprising that after years of sanctions, 63% of 
the Iranian population is still in favour of the 
nuclear programme and blames the US for the 
economic crisis.40  
-  Due to historical relations, the Iranian rulers 
consider sanctions as another US ploy to 
achieve regime change. This perceived 
existential threat is an incentive rather than a 
deterrent to proceed with the nuclear 
programme. Submission to the transatlantic 
coalition would not only call into question the 
legitimacy of the regime but also the entire 
system on which the Islamic Republic and its 
institutions are founded. Rather than 
strengthen the opposition, this perspective 
also threatens moderate elements in the 
Iranian elite. 
-  UN Security Council members China and 
Russia do not consider increasing economic 
pressure as the way forward to find a 
compromise with Teheran.41 Under this cover, 
countries like India and Turkey, which rely on 
Iranian oil and gas, can defend their economic 
interests more easily. The Iranian regime 
perfectly perceives and plays on this division 
in the international community, finding ways 
to export a considerable share of its oil 
through both official channels and through 
smuggling. Thus, together with the measures 
taken to transform the Iranian economy into 
an “economy of resistance”,42 trade revenues 
continue to secure both a certain economic 
stability and government revenues to finance 
the nuclear programme.  
8.  How to proceed? 
For these reasons the EU should reassess its 
approach with regard to the Iranian nuclear 
programme. In doing so, the Union should be 
conscious of its diplomatic and strategic 
possibilities. Compared to the US, the EU has 
two important advantages: first, its historical 
relations with Iran are not based on deep-seated 
mutual mistrust. EU member states still have 
considerable economic leverage in the country 
and maintain direct diplomatic ties. Second, 
whereas Washington’s scope for action is limited 
by commitments to its strategic allies in the 
Middle East and the Gulf region, the European 
Union is less prone to Israeli or Saudi pressure 
and is thus perceived as a less antagonistic actor 
than the US.43 Conversely, as the fruitless pre-
2006 E3/EU initiative44 and polls in Iran have 
shown, the EU only has a secondary role in a 
play that revolves around two regional 
protagonists: Iran and the US. Until their E3+3 COERCIVE DIPLOMACY TOWARDS IRAN | 7 
 
differences are resolved, a major bone of 
contention will lie in the wider Middle East. 
Nevertheless, the EU can contribute to the 
peaceful resolution of the protracted dispute. 
Below, we identify three steps that can be taken 
to that end. These steps are not necessarily 
sequenced and could also be taken in parallel. 
Step 1: Clarifying objectives 
The European Union should help the US to 
reassure Tehran that regime change is not the 
objective of negotiations. The objective of a more 
ambitious EU public diplomacy towards Iran 
should be to convince Iranians that they have the 
right to civilian enrichment and that sanctions 
are only directed against the military aspects of 
the nuclear programme. It should be made 
crystal clear that only the highest level of 
transparency, backed up by the most intrusive 
form of IAEA inspections, can allay the 
international community’s concerns that Iran’s 
intentions are not to obtain nuclear weapons 
capability. Through these measures, the EU 
would take the edge off the Iranian hardline 
rhetoric that portrays the dispute as a clash of 
civilisations. Instead, it would embolden the 
moderate elements within the Iranian elite. 
Step 2: Improving public diplomacy 
Bearing in mind the overwhelming popular 
support for a tough stance towards Iran, 
especially in the EU’s three big member states,45 
European governments should seek to break the 
vicious cycle of public opinion and foreign 
policy that seeks to pander to public demand by 
implementing a policy that is intended to deliver 
quick results, but which undermines chances for 
a peaceful resolution of the dispute. For this 
purpose, European decision-makers should 
together find ways to sensitise public opinion, 
especially via the media but also through 
academic and sports events that bring together 
European and Iranian citizens. Needless to say, 
the intensification of people-to-people contact 
only makes sense when Iranians can experience 
the EU. Therefore, instead of further cutting 
contact to Iranian civil society by complicating 
popular student exchange programmes like 
“Erasmus Mundus” or remittances from exiled 
Iranians to their families,46 the EU should 
reinforce intercultural exchange between 
Europeans and Iranians. Furthermore, member 
states should incite companies and banks to 
continue selling medicine and other 
humanitarian goods to Iran. After all, the 
sanctions do not prohibit that. This can be 
achieved by a clarification campaign within the 
EU to dispel doubts about the scope of sanctions. 
Finally, the EU and its member states should 
strengthen their diplomatic work in Iran. In this 
regard, the UK should reopen its embassy in 
Tehran47 and member states should allow the EU 
to set up its own delegation in the country.48 All 
these measures could improve the image of the 
EU as a benevolent political actor with the 
Iranian public. The implementation of a plan to 
establish an EU website in farsi would certainly 
help in terms of outreach.49  
 
Table 2. International stance on sanctions 
 
Source: Pew Research Center. 
Step 3: Recalibrating pressure and 
introducing incentives 
After the failure of the Almaty talks, the chorus 
of experts and diplomats who warn that the 
current sanctions policy will not resolve the 8 | BLOCKMANS & WAIZER 
 
nuclear dispute with Iran is growing louder.50 
The further tightening of sanctions, advocated by 
those in the US who wish to avoid having to 
resort to the military option against Iran will be 
counterproductive politically, both within Iran 
and with international partners (e.g. China and 
Russia) and neighbouring countries of Iran (e.g. 
Turkey and Pakistan). As argued above, one of 
the goals of the E3+3 initiative should be to 
strengthen moderate forces within Iran’s political 
elite by providing them with arguments for an 
alternative narrative to the hardliners’ anti-
western rhetoric. An EU initiative that places 
more emphasis on the extension of incentives to 
Iran could cajole the clerical regime into 
substantive negotiations geared at striking a deal 
on the nuclear issue.51 Such positive 
conditionality would naturally foresee the 
gradual lifting of EU and US sanctions on the 
energy sector and the Central Bank, but should 
arguably go beyond that to inspire genuine 
interest in negotiations with the regime. Thus, 
the E3+3 should project the extension of financial 
and technical aid in designated areas, trade 
preferences, and cooperation on shared security 
interests (e.g. instability in the Middle East, the 
flow of drugs and refugees from Afghanistan). 
In so doing, the E3+3 would show both the 
Iranian regime and the population that western 
powers are not seeking to prevent Iran from 
becoming a modern regional power whose 
independence is respected by the international 
community. At the same time, this wider debate 
would allow moderate forces in Iran to 
demonstrate that the US does not strive for 
regime change and that complying with the E3+3 
demands is not a sign of weakness vis-à-vis EU 
and US pressure. The cost-benefit ratio of such 
an offer would certainly reinforce the narrative 
of the moderate elements in the Iranian elite. The 
ruling hardliners’ rejection of such a 
comprehensive offer and the continued blockage 
of negotiations on the nuclear programme would 
no doubt undermine their position. 
This comprehensive approach will only have a 
chance if three conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, 
the proposal should not be accompanied by the 
threat or adoption of tougher sanctions. As the 
failure of the Tehran agreement, the 2008 offer 
and the latest negotiation rounds in Almaty have 
shown, it will be hard for the moderates within 
the regime to argue for constructive negotiations 
if at the same time the US and the EU match the 
image Iranians have been given of them as 
“arrogant and imperialist” powers. Secondly, the 
E3+3 should not quit the negotiating table when 
difficulties rise with regard to the nuclear issue. 
Policy-makers should use patience to give the 
comprehensive approach a chance. They should 
resort to informal ‘track II’ diplomacy if there is a 
need to explore options which may, at first, not 
be palatable for the parties to the dispute. 
Thirdly, (the threat of) a military strike against 
Iran may prevent or derail any willingness on 
the part of Iran’s clerical regime to negotiate in 
earnest with the E3+3. The US should therefore 
take this option off the table. It should also be 
seen as trying its utmost to prevent an Israeli 
strike, however unlikely it is that this will 
happen. 
9.  Concluding remarks 
It is impossible to assess the chances of success of 
such a comprehensive approach. Given the 
history of relations with Iran, the continuation of 
the hard-line Islamic regime of the Supreme 
Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, instability and the 
nuclear imbalance in the Middle East and the 
myth of nuclear deterrence in general,52 
prospects for a compromise do not appear to be 
very promising. However, if there is any chance 
of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear 
bomb and sparking a new wave of nuclear 
proliferation53 and thereby setting off a military 
confrontation with Israel (backed-up by the US), 
then the E3+3 process will have to reinforce its 
diplomatic efforts, not push Iran further into the 
corner. After all, as the saying goes, a cornered 
cat can make surprising moves. 
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